Following the Security Council of Turkey’s removal of Georgia and Armenia from the country’s list of national enemies last summer, officials in Ankara have found time for cultural diplomacy.

The Turkish government has agreed to fund and carry out repairs on four Georgian churches on Turkish territory in exchange for rehabilitation of four mosques and the construction of one new place of worship for the country’s Muslims on Georgian territory.

Turkey has also been outstretching its hand to Armenia, first through the much-feted “football diplomacy” of late 2009, and then through an agreement on the construction of an Armenian church on Turkish territory. It seems that Ankara is willing to spend both cultural and financial capital in battle for the hearts and minds of the Caucasus.

It is obvious that Turkey is a serious competitor with the Kremlin in the Caucasus. Their old enemy is currently in the process of regaining the positions it lost in the beginning of the 20th century. It is Georgia’s number one trade partner; it has a leading position in trade relations with Azerbaijan, and even though there is an absence of diplomatic relations with Armenia, a surprisingly large amount of business is done between the two states.

Despite Ankara and Moscow seeming to have relatively good relations and a visible partnership, tensions between the two giants over the Caucasus are becoming more and more obvious. These tensions are underlined by the fact that while Armenia and Georgia were removed from the country’s “red book” Russia, along with Israel, was placed in its list of potential rivals for the next five years.

The agreement between Moscow and Yerevan to extending the lifetime of Russia’s Gyumri military base for another 49 years was certainly response to the decision by Turkey’s Security Council.

One does not need to be a particularly talented analyst to see that Moscow’s stubbornness on the in the issue of Abkhazia in 2008 had little to do with its hatred of Saakashvili. The Turkish factor was significant in their decision to continue their occupation of Georgia’s breakaway region. The Kremlin is determined not repeat the mistake of 2004 and allow the ‘Adjarization’ of Abkhazia. By way of explanation, it could be said that today Adjara is just as much Turkish as it is Georgian: the territory is Georgian but economy is Turkish, and whoever pays the piper calls the tune. The Kremlin could never tolerate the same scenario in Abkhazia. It is a fact that with the August 2008 occupation, the Kremlin drew a line for both Turkey and Georgia at the Enguri River.

Turkey has strategic relations with two of the three South Caucasus countries: Georgia and Azerbaijan, whereas Moscow considers only Yerevan as its strategic partner. It is in open conflict with Georgia, and as for Baku, its relations with Azerbaijan are in total chaos.

“No problems with our neighbors” is the motto of contemporary Turkish politics. Agreeing to the restoration of the Georgian churches is part of that politics. Despite the fact that this policy did not work in the case of Armenia, Ankara is certain that despite resistance, they will be able to bring Georgia on board.

The first public statement regarding the new Turkish-Georgian agreement was made by Mikheil Saakashvili on January 26 in his televised question and answer session with the Georgian public, where he spoke about the possible construction of a mosque in Batumi.

The president’s statement was soon followed by an interview with Georgia’s Minister of Culture where the details of the agreement were explained in detail.

The first objections to the joint Georgian-Turkish project appeared in Tbilisi, with concerns being expressed that it would be unfair to build an active mosque in exchange for the restoration of Georgian cultural monuments. According to their argument, the restoration of the monuments has nothing to do with construction of functioning mosques.

The main complaint of the project’s opponents concerns the restoration of the Rabbath mosque in Akhaltsikhe. This complex is a miniature copy of the Hagia Sofia in Istanbul and critics have argued that the move has grave symbolic implications. The project’s opponents argue that Akhaltsikhe region is fully Christian, and the restoration of the mosque has not only cultural but political meaning.

The issue was first raised in 2006, but the Georgian side refused to make the Akhaltsikhe Rabbath mosque functional after a Moscow-backed PR campaign turned the Georgian public against the plan. After the collapse of the 2006 project, Ankara let the matter drop.

It seems that Turkey and Georgia are trying again for a second time - we should hope that Moscow’s ‘invisible hand’ will not appear again.

By Zaza Jgharkava
4.02.2011

http://www.georgiatoday.ge/article_details.php?id=8655&cat=top_b&version=547